Abstract
Introduction
Bioprospecting, or "biopiracy,"
1 begins when firms from developed countries, such as multinational corporations based in the United States, interact with aboriginal or indigenous cultures in developing countries. The firms learn the "traditional knowledge" of these cultures, especially as that knowledge is applied to biotechnology. This knowledge is then appropriated by that firm under 646 Jonathan B. Warner the developed country's intellectual property laws, to the exclusion of the indigenous cultures from which that knowledge originated.
Some commentators have deemed the current rhetoric in the bioprospecting debate inadequate to generate "grass roots support." 2 The objective of this Note is to use global themes and perspectives to aid in reframing the bioprospecting debate. In doing so, this Note will first provide a general review of the current rhetoric of this debate, including negative effects of bioprospecting and commonly proposed solutions to these effects. This Note will then apply global themes to the bioprospecting debate and propose a legal approach that attempts to harmonize these themes with many of the underlying issues.
As background, in applying global perspectives to analyze this phenomenon, this Note incorporates an understanding of globalization that includes the movement of goods, knowledge, and technology across international borders. 3 This understanding is focused upon international competition and local responses to globalization. This understanding also considers whether increased globalization correlates to increased socioeconomic inequality or instead to a reduction of poverty, and what can be done to change the status quo in promotion of "the common good." 4 Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the phenomenon of bioprospecting, including definitions, scope of the present discussion's use of that term, and examples. Part II reviews commonly accepted effects of bioprospecting, notably neocolonialism and the threat to global biodiversity. It also notes positive effects. Part III briefly summarizes the two most prevalent viewpoints on how to best address the phenomenon of bioprospecting, which consist of developing an international or transnational sui generis system and amending the United States patent code. Then, Part IV attempts to reframe the bioprospecting debate. It analyzes bioprospecting through a global lens, giving emphasis to international competitive efforts, embedded globalization, and the response of concerned citizens. Finally, it proposes a legal solution that attempts to harmonize these global themes with the underlying issues of bioprospecting.
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The appropriation of traditional knowledge has broad ramifications, especially with regard to copyrights and patents. 11 However, while the copyrighting of traditional folklore and oral heritages is worth exploring further, this Note's discussion is limited to the patenting of traditional knowledge as that knowledge is applied to biotechnology. 12 For purposes of this Note, "biotechnology" is understood as defined in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 13 The CBD defines biotechnology as "any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivates thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use." 14 Three popular examples give reality to the phenomenon of bioprospecting: the neem tree, the turmeric plant, and basmati rice. 15 Each of these bioresources originates in India, and each has been used for its respective purpose for generations. 16 In the case of the neem tree, 17 W.R. Grace and Company recently obtained U.S. patents over several neem-based products. 18 Because neem-based products are and have been common in India for some time, these patents have become a rallying point against what is viewed as Western imperialism toward Indian culture, although in this particular case there seems to be no risk of 11 . See infra Part II. 12. While naturally occurring products are not patentable, modifications thereof are patentable in the United States. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) . For present purposes, I am assuming that such patents generally can be acquired legitimately in the country of application. For example, while 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) may pose particular difficulties, it is assumed that this statute is and can be legitimately avoided. See the basmati rice example, infra p. 5.
13. E.g., Marden, supra note 1, at 279 n. adverse socioeconomic effects on the Indian people. 19 Examples similar to the neem tree are numerous. 20 As the case of the turmeric plant demonstrates, not all such patents go legally unchallenged. 21 In 1996, the Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) successfully challenged and overturned two U.S. patents covering a method (long known to people indigenous to India) for administering turmeric to wounds for healing. 22 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) ruled the patents were anticipated and obvious when the CSIR demonstrated thirty-two prior written references, some in ancient Sanskrit. 23 Although the threat of patent invalidation, such as occurred with the turmeric plant, 24 may deter relatively unsophisticated patentees, for more sophisticated entities these threats are most likely hollow. 25 For example, RiceTec, a Texas-based corporation, 26 recently obtained a patent on basmati rice-a grain produced in India at a rate of 650,000 tons annually. 27 Unlike the turmeric patent, however, the basmati rice patent crossbreeds the Indian plant with other 23. De Carvalho, supra note 22, at 65. As a point of general overview, the United States patent code disallows all patent applications that are deemed either "anticipated" (that is, prior art-e.g., earlier patents or other references that already explain the applicant's desired claims) or "obvious" (that is, the applicant does not genuinely claim anything novel for patenting purposes, or the application simply claims a naturally occurring or existing product). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) . With regard to foreign prior art, the U.S. patent code clearly-and controversiallyrequires the foreign prior art to exist in written form for it to anticipate a claim on a later application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) . For a discussion of extending the reach of U.S. patents into the international arena, see Part III.A.1.
24. See Quinn, supra note 6, at 290. 25. Cf. id. at 290-91 (noting the inability to cancel patents on basmati rice and periwinkle plants, both of which are owned by large U.S. companies).
26. See K.S. Jayaramen, India to challenge basmati rice "invention", Nature, Feb. 19, 1999, at 728. 27. Quinn, supra note 6, at 290.
varieties. 28 This creates a novel and nonnatural product for U.S. patent purposes. 29 Such a product perhaps represents the most threatening means for undermining traditional knowledge as a bar to patentability, as international agreements such as TRIPS may allow the newly patented products to then be enforced against indigenous cultures.
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II. Global Effects of Bioprospecting
The effects of bioprospecting extend beyond the local communities that were the original holders of the traditional knowledge. Bioprospecting can have a negative financial impact on indigenous peoples, as international agreements allow U.S. patent holders to exercise their monopoly protection against indigenous persons in the United States as well as foreign markets. 31 As discussed below in Subparts A and B, the negative impacts of biodiversity can also include threats to cultural identity 32 and environmental resources. 33 However, commentators also have noted positive effects of bioprospecting, as addressed in Subpart C.
34
A. Neocolonialism
Neocolonialism is intricately linked to bioprospecting. 35 assumption that it is their natural right to take these resources. 39 As one commentator notes:
The freedom that transnational corporations are claiming through intellectual property rights protection in the GATT agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights . . . is the freedom that European colonizers have claimed since 1492. Columbus set a precedent when he treated the license to conquer non-European peoples as a natural right of European men. The land titles issued by the pope through European kings and queens were the first patents. . . . Eurocentric notions of property and piracy are the bases on which the [intellectual property] laws of the GATT and World Trade Organization . . . have been framed. When Europeans first colonized the non-European world, they felt it was their duty to "discover and conquer," to "subdue, occupy, and possess[]" . . . everything, every society, every culture. The colonies have now been extended to the interior spaces, the "genetic codes" of life-forms from microbes and plants to animals, including humans. . . . The assumption of empty lands . . . is now being expanded to "empty life," seeds and medicinal plants. . . . The same logic is now used to appropriate biodiversity from the original owners and innovators by defining their seeds, medicinal plants, and medical knowledge as nature, as nonscience, and treating the tools of genetic engineering as the yardstick of "improvement." . . . At the heart of the GATT treaty and its patent laws is the treatment of biopiracy as a natural right of Western corporations, necessary for the "development" of Third World communities. 40 This neocolonialism takes advantage of and abuses aboriginal cultures by stripping them of their ability to participate fully in markets available for their knowledge and skills. 41 For example, W.R. Grace's neem-based patents give it control over all such products in, at least, the U.S. market, potentially denying indigenous Indian companies what could otherwise be their largest and most lucrative market. 42 Thus, the indigenous peoples and companies could be prevented from applying their knowledge and skills to the capitalist systems dominating the world economy. 43 Further, because of their established economic dominance, the northern nations are able to impose their ideologies into international agreements relatively easily. 44 This neocolonialism perpetuates the North-South divide, as typically none of the profits made by the multinational companies return to the states or peoples of origination.
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B. Loss of Global Biodiversity
In addition to the problem of neocolonialism, it is generally agreed that the threat of losing the world's biodiversity is growing. 46 Biodiversity is important for at least two reasons. 47 First, it is an "ecological theorem" that ecosystems that are more diverse are less vulnerable to destruction. 48 Second, the loss of biodiversity means the loss of genetic information. 49 The loss of genetic information, in turn, may result in the loss of "useful templates"-for example, DNA-that may hold keys to medicinal progress. 50 Bioprospecting may threaten biodiversity in that it leads to the "overuse"-that is, widespread gathering to the point of depletion-of particular bioresources. knowledge of bioresources only to have that knowledge monopolized to their detriment (or at least lack of benefit). 53 Multinational firms rarely share the profits they gain from bioprospecting. 54 As will be discussed below, profit sharing with indigenous peoples could provide an economic incentive for them to protect what biodiversity they can. 55 Such incentives would encourage indigenous persons to engage in preservation without wholly denying bioprospecting efforts. 56 Hence, those who are most familiar with the relevant ecological systems would be placed in a situation of active preservation to ensure minimal and controlled intrusion on their adjacent ecological systems.
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C. Positive Effects of Bioprospecting
Despite the serious concerns of neocolonialism and loss of biodiversity, there also may be significant positive effects of bioprospecting. 58 Bioprospecting allows those who are in the best economic position to disseminate valuable information to do so uninhibited. 59 For example, as many as four-fifths of all drugs have their basis in natural plant resources. 60 Hence, this use of broad intellectual property protection may increase the likelihood of finding and distributing medicinal cures. In addition, it can be argued that bioprospecting breaks down the NorthSouth divide, which tends to separate developed and undeveloped countries, and establishes incentives to preserve the world's biodiversity. Bioprospecting creates economic incentives for large and wealthy businesses to invest in protecting the world's biodiversity to assure that valuable resources are not lost. 63 Further, knowing that bioresources in themselves may be valuable to developed nations, southern nations may be able to establish a system of protection for domestic resources. 64 This system of protection could dramatically increase southern bargaining power and help dissolve the North-South divide. 65 
III. Addressing the Global Effects of Bioprospecting
The vast majority of commentators on bioprospecting seek to find solutions to the abovementioned effects of neocolonialism and loss of global biodiversity. The two most prevalent proposals are creating sui generis systems to operate between governments and the for-profit organizations interested in bioprospecting, and amending U.S. patent law. 66 As shown below, although neither of these proposed solutions alone may be completely effective, their combined efforts may yield a favorable solution.
A. Sui Generis Systems
A popular proposal to prevent the negative effects of bioprospecting is the creation of a sui generis system between governments of developing countries and for-profit organizations seeking the bioresources of those countries.
67 Such systems usually take one of two forms: involvement by intergovernmental agencies or local governments-the approach taken by the WTO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and India-or the promotion of reciprocal, profit-sharing techniques between multinational corporations and the indigenous cultures in question-an approach popularized in Costa Rica.
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These systems can be established through contracts, legislation, or an expanded understanding of human rights. 69 However, practical considerations may result in the long-term failure of these systems. 
In General
Arguments favoring involvement by governmental bodies note several potential benefits, whether they involve intergovernmental agencies, such as the WTO or WIPO, or internal legislative acts, such as those found in India. 71 These benefits include an emphasis on the commonly held indigenous perspective that communal rights underlie traditional knowledge 72 and an opportunity for increased access to traditional knowledge. 73 Other commentators note that even where an intergovernmental agreement does not have the force of law in the relevant country, 74 its "spirit and substance" should be adopted as such. 75 Arguments favoring sui generis systems that require profit sharing between multinational corporations and indigenous cultures-a method adopted in Costa Rica-also have potential benefits. 76 As one commentator notes:
[T]here could be a sui generis system derived from this intellectual property system that would fit the needs of the indigenous peoples. . . . Pharmaceutical corporations seeking to develop technology based on indigenous knowledge would still benefit . . . however, the economic benefits and the credit for the source should be awarded justly. In addition, the safeguards on biodiversity[] would further protect the disappearance of plant variety that threaten[s] the world community. It is important after all to recognize that nature and its derivatives are for the community to enjoy, not just for a few who can afford it. 77 Such a sui generis system could protect worldwide cultures from the loss of global biodiversity. 78 It also could help eliminate the North-South divide by requiring northern industries to pay adequate compensation to southern peoples for exploitation of the South's genetic resources.
79 Establishment of these sui generis systems can be through acts of intergovernmental agencies, local "sword and shield" legislation-acts that seek to protect local interests while also defeating outside exploitation of those interests 80 -or government-corporate contracts. 81 
Intergovernmental Agencies
The WTO and WIPO are leading intergovernmental actors in the intellectual property arena. The WTO is the major international force behind the protection of patent rights beyond the issuing nation's own borders. 82 The WTO has instituted the TRIPS agreement as a component of its more general international agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 83 The TRIPS agreement has been criticized for its role in perpetuating bioprospecting and its abuses. 84 While the WTO recently has sought to review these problems, 85 TRIPS does not confer rights upon traditional knowledge or genetic resources. 86 Rather, many of TRIPS's provisions are open to interpretation by the Member States as to the scope of any remedial or preventative nature. 87 As one scholar notes:
The TRIPS Agreement is silent on traditional knowledge, genetic resources, folklore and biodiversity. However, it has certain provisions that could be interpreted in favour of the concept of transfer of technology and access. Article 7 stipulates the objectives of the Agreement that "[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." Article 8 stipulates the principles that include the prevention against the abuse of intellectual property rights or restrictive practices. These provisions are broad and subjected to . . . interpretation by the Member states. They provide the safeguard, but not the protection for traditional knowledge, genetic resources, or folklore directly. The same thing could be said about Article 27.2 on the exclusion from patentability on the ground of public order or morality, including prejudice to the environment. They could be used to prevent . . . unfair or abusive exploitation of genetic resources, but they do not confer legal protection to traditional knowledge or genetic resources. Article 67 deals with technical cooperation from the developed countries to the developing and least developed countries. It also refers to assistance in the prevention against abuse.
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The allowance for Member States to adopt their own remedial or preventative solution is more explicitly acknowledged in article 27.3(b) of TRIPS, which allows "for the protection of plant varieties either by patents, by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof." 89 This specific article is currently being considered by the WTO for expansion or harmonization with the CBD.
90
As sui generis systems are uniquely developed by a country or region according to that country's or region's needs, 91 the TRIPS component of GATT authorizes countries or regions to apply their individual solutions to bioprospecting problems; however, the general view under TRIPS is that traditional knowledge is a part of a "global commons available for exploitation by all." 92 WIPO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, also has recently visited the bioprospecting issue. 93 However, the results of WIPO's recent discussions on the issue are inconclusive: On the one hand, WIPO's consideration of the bioprospecting issue is a clear indication of the issue's importance; on the other hand, it is also clear that many countries remain unconvinced as to whether, or 88 how, to change the international patent regime. 94 The leading proposal for addressing bioprospecting under the auspices of WIPO seems likely to be a variation of the Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (Model Provisions). 95 Although the Model Provisions are based on the protection of traditional folklore from foreign copyrights, the framework may be applicable to bioprospecting. 96 However, the criminal and civil penalties under the Model Provisions are, like the laws that allow for bioprospecting to begin with, Western in origin, perhaps perpetuating North-South issues.
97 Specifically, the folklore protection provided by the Model Provisions is based on an adaptation of Western copyright law-a law which itself is accused by indigenous persons as being the source of the problems. 98 This adaptation shifts ownership in the folklore from a creating individual to an individual authorized to license the use of the folklore. 99 However, this solution still misses the communal property mindset pervasive among indigenous cultures in these matters. 
Local Legislation
India and Costa Rica have taken different approaches to internal sui generis responses and solutions. India has enacted several "sword-and-shield" attempts to curb bioprospecting efforts and protect its traditional knowledge, while Costa Rica has sought a profit-sharing technique with bioprospecting companies. One of India's legislative acts punishes those who apply for a patent in India that is based on Indian bioresources with up to five years in prison and up to a $30,000 fine. 101 Because indigenous persons are unlikely to seek such a patent, the broad language in the law seems unlikely to ever apply to them. been enacted in other countries. 102 Other Indian legislation is purely defensive. 103 For example, India recently took affirmative steps toward the creation of a digital library of traditional knowledge in an attempt to preempt applicants for U.S. patents by creating a published foreign use, undermining any assertions that a patent application meets the United States' novelty requirement. 104 Some of this information is being published in up to six languages. 105 However, while such databases may operate effectively to preempt the patentability of certain subject matter, 106 they may ultimately be nothing more than a fast track to biopiracy for more sophisticated firms capable of making technical alterations to recorded information for purposes of patentability. 107 The Costa Rican sui generis system is a compensation-based model, unlike the "sword-and-shield" approach taken in India. A popular example is the 1991 agreement between the Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio), a private, nonprofit Costa Rican conservation organization, and Merck, a U.S.-based multinational pharmaceutical company. 108 Under this agreement:
INBio initially supplied Merck with ten thousand biosamples or extracts from wild plants, insects and micro-organisms for a consideration of 1.135 million dollars (U.S. Such agreements allow for at least some flow of proceeds from products developed through bioprospecting to return to the country of origin. Sui generis systems may find moral justification in a human rights analysis. 110 As one commentator notes, "protecting traditional knowledge cannot be achieved without also upholding the individual and collective human rights of traditional knowledge holders and their communities."
111 This expansion of human rights could naturally lead to a system of reciprocal compensation between the profiting firm and either the indigenous peoples or their host country. 112 Expansion of human rights may also lead to a long-term resolution to the bioprospecting problem, but this expanded understanding is unlikely to occur on a sufficiently broad scale in a relatively short time frame. 
Problems with Sui Generis Systems
Sui generis systems between local governments and multinational, forprofit organizations generally cannot be implemented as currently proposed without concern for their long-term stability. In some cases, proposed resolution of issues may not be truly obligatory. 114 In other cases, the sui generis system may not be truly effective. 115 For example, a critical concern underlying many international or transnational sui generis systems is identifying a court in which these systems can be enforced. 116 However, even where obligatory enforcement procedures may be clear, they may still prove questionable in their effectiveness. 117 For example, WTO arbitration under TRIPS, while obligatory, is somewhat dependent on the bargaining power of the countries in question. 118 If the two parties to a dispute are the United States and Madagascar, 119 for example, bargaining power is unlikely to be equal, and the U.S.-based corporations that are the source of the dispute may be able to economically justify a breach of contract or other failure to adhere to Madagascar's demands. 120 So long as this disparity in bargaining power exists, a permanent effective solution is unlikely. 121 In addition, although agreements such as the INBio-Merck agreement allow for some of the proceeds to return to the country of origin, it is likely that these proceeds are nominal compared to the bioprospecting company's profits. 122 Also, such agreements do not necessarily address the exclusion of indigenous persons from capitalist markets.
B. Amending U.S. Patent Law-The Long Term Solution
The primary policy of U.S. patent law is to protect the inventor of a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"; 123 thus, patents such as the basmati rice patent are squarely within the policies of U.S. patent law. 124 In response to this broad policy, many commentators suggest amending U.S. patent law to reflect sensitivity toward developing nations and peoples in cases of bioprospecting. 125 To effectuate this increased sensitivity, the United States Congress or courts could adopt moral rights, 126 or Congress could recognize unpublished foreign prior use as a bar to patentability.
127 Also, Congress could seek to increase international harmonization among intellectual property rights, for example by increasing conformity to the CBD. 128 Finally, Congress could propose legislation to encourage INBio-Merck-type agreements, increasing benefits sharing in an attempt to make developing countries willing partners in utilizing bioresources.
129 Such legislation, perhaps, could create an exception to patentability for any traditional-knowledge-based patentssuch as W.R. Grace's neem-based patents-that are secured without such an agreement. Each of these proposals raises some concerns. The United States has actively chosen to not adopt moral rights or other policies common outside the United States and reflected in international systems, such as a first-to-file system. 131 Also, altering the policies of the United States may result in losing the positive effects that bioprospecting stands to offer, especially if amendments to the U.S. patent code change longstanding U.S. policies too drastically. 132 While an amendment to the U.S. patent code could be a stable long-term solution, any amendment likely to drastically change longstanding U.S. policies would require a lengthy amount of time to gain approval. 133 As such, this solution is untenable in the short term.
134 So long as the United States and other northern nations are economically ahead of the rest of the world in their intellectual property law systems, 135 these nations are unlikely to make changes that would negatively affect their competitive advantage.
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IV. Local Responses to Globalization
The current rhetoric in the bioprospecting debate is inadequate to accomplish the goals of many commentators on this subject, most notably because of the problems with sui generis systems and the lack of appeal to either Congress or U.S.-based businesses in amending U.S. patent law. 137 While sui generis systems are unlikely to be effective permanent solutions, 138 they may be sufficient until amendments to the U.S. patent system gain favor. 139 Still, it is conceded that U.S. patent policies are not without positive effects that outweigh the desire to adjust for bioprospecting. 140 As explained below, by considering dominant global themes 141 with the bioprospecting debate, it may be possible to reframe the proposed sui-generis-amendment solutions in such a manner as to preserve the positive effects of current U.S. patent policies while addressing the need to protect traditional knowledge. Specifically, focusing resolution of the bioprospecting debate on increased international competition 142 and the response of globally concerned local citizens 143 shows how possible resolution of the bioprospecting debate can be achieved in a way likely to garner grass-roots support.
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A. International Competition
Bioprospecting is naturally implicated by an understanding of globalization that involves the increasing movement of goods, knowledge, and technology across international borders. 145 As has been demonstrated, bioprospecting is the movement of traditional knowledge from the developing country as a point of origin to the developed country as a point of production. 146 Goods are then shipped back across borders in reverse order, from developed country to developing country and others in the global marketplace as rich multinational corporations increase profits at the expense of undeveloped, indigenous cultures.
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When viewed through this global lens, the rise of bioprospecting activities creates concern analogous to a "race-to-the-bottom" for control over indigenous knowledge. 148 As one commentator notes:
140. See generally Heald, supra note 2 (outlining positive effects of bioprospecting, including the potential for finding medicinal cures and protecting biogenetic resources, and negative effects of regulation, including increasing the scope of already broad IP rights and increasing transaction costs and the potential for government corruption).
141. See generally David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader (2d ed. 2003) (collecting works into five common themes of globalization: the reconfiguration of power and authority of states, the loss of a singular cultural identity, the dominance of the world marketplace, the perpetuation of inequality among nations, and the emergence of new extranational entities).
142. Hence, as the wealth of the bioprospecting industry increases, the likely regulation of this industry decreases.
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Rather than relying solely on the sui-generis-amendment solutions to the bioprospecting debate, developing countries may find that the most protective measure would be the adoption of an intellectual property system competitive with that of the United States. 151 For example, the developing countries at issue could seek to establish laws that allow for a broader range of patents for individuals, including those sought on traditional-knowledge-based products.
152 However, as developing countries often view such property as community-based property, 153 these new laws could create a localized dual-rights system. The patent would be recognized as valid in the developing country-and therefore also valid abroad under TRIPS 154 -but the patent's monopolistic rights would be unenforceable within the developing country, which is not likely to be a bioprospecting company's target market. 155 In other words, the bioprospecting firm would get a patent in the country where the knowledge on which the patent is based originated, but this patent would only be enforceable in the international arena. 156 This system would maintain the developing nation's internal market over the traditional knowledge, 157 while at the same time maintaining bioprospecting companies' incentives to gather and distribute potentially lifesaving medicines. 158 Such a system would also be to the economic advantage of both the developing countries and the bioprospecting companies. Developing countries already have the cost-related advantages of location and access to traditional resources and bioresources, 159 and adapting competitive intellectual property laws could encourage multinational corporations to establish regional locations to take advantage of this protection, location, and access. 160 This legal proposal directly addresses the commonly identified problems and benefits of bioprospecting. This proposed system may present ideological conflicts, at least insofar as the developing country is acquiescing to northern demands of intellectual property recognition. 161 Nevertheless, these conflicts could be mitigated by the fact that the legal change stems from the country of the traditional knowledge's origin. 162 In addition, these conflicts could be mitigated by requiring the patent to be unenforceable in the jurisdiction where the traditional reexamination on an issued patent covering products of Ayahuasca. 182 As a result of this petition, the issued patent was reversed. 183 Another group of pro bono lawyers based in Washington, D.C. also recently challenged the validity of certain patents that incorporate indigenous Peruvian medicines. 184 As the above examples demonstrate, focusing resolution of the bioprospecting debate on the response of globally concerned local citizens shows how U.S. patents can be affected, increasing the economic incentive for bioprospecting companies that are seeking patent protection to take added measures to ensure patent validity. This response of consumers goes beyond the mere use of consumer power to protest. 185 The economic incentive for multinational corporations to adhere to the laws of developing nations, whether those laws represent sui generis systems or internationally competitive laws, also can be established as the response of globally concerned citizens directly affects bioprospecting corporations. 186 
Conclusion
The bioprospecting debate presents a controversy that, at its extremes, involves the conflicting views and interests of indigenous peoples and multinational corporations. 187 As one commentator notes, "[o]nly when indigenous peoples . . . and . . . their cultural world views, customary laws, and ecological practices are recognized as fundamental contributions to resolving local social justice concerns will we be engaged in anything we can genuinely call a dialogue."
188
The current rhetoric of this debate fails to conceptualize the issues of bioprospecting in a manner that will generate grass-roots support. Shifting this de-bate's focus through the lens of globalization emphasizes the role non-U.S. economies and nonstate actors can have on the global economy and the global culture. In this manner, sensitivity toward developing economies and indigenous persons can be accounted for through an internationally competitive intellectual property legal system adopted by developing countries. This proposal addresses the negative effects of bioprospecting while also retaining the positive effects. With the use of embedded globalization and competitive international legal systems, the status quo can be changed in promotion of the common good, and globalization can help to reduce poverty and inequality.
